A Correlation Attack Against User Mobility Privacy in a Large-scale WLAN network by Tan, Keren et al.
Dartmouth College 
Dartmouth Digital Commons 
Dartmouth Scholarship Faculty Work 
9-20-2010 
A Correlation Attack Against User Mobility Privacy in a Large-









Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/facoa 
 Part of the Computer Sciences Commons 
Dartmouth Digital Commons Citation 
Tan, Keren; Yan, Guanhua; Yeo, Jihwang; and Kotz, David, "A Correlation Attack Against User Mobility 
Privacy in a Large-scale WLAN network" (2010). Dartmouth Scholarship. 3477. 
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/facoa/3477 
This Conference Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Work at Dartmouth Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dartmouth Scholarship by an authorized administrator of 
Dartmouth Digital Commons. For more information, please contact 
dartmouthdigitalcommons@groups.dartmouth.edu. 
A Correlation Attack Against User Mobility Privacy in a
Large-scale WLAN Network
Keren Tan









Jihwang Yeo, David Kotz






User association logs collected from real-world wireless LANs
have facilitated wireless network research greatly. To protect
user privacy, the common practice in sanitizing these data
before releasing them to the public is to anonymize users’
sensitive information such as the MAC addresses of their de-
vices and their exact association locations. In this work, we
demonstrate that these sanitization measures are insufficient
in protecting user privacy from a novel type of correlation
attack that is based on CRF (Conditional Random Field).
In such a correlation attack, the adversary observes the vic-
tim’s AP (Access Point) association activities for a short
period of time and then infers her corresponding identity in
a released user association dataset. Using a user associa-
tion log that contains more than three thousand users and
millions of AP association records, we demonstrate that the
CRF-based technique is able to pinpoint the victim’s iden-
tity exactly with a probability as high as 70%.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Operations—network monitoring ; I.5 [Pattern Recogni-




privacy, mobility, wireless network, sanitization, anonymiza-
tion, Conditional Random Field
1. INTRODUCTION
Network traffic traces collected from production networks
have played a critical role in understanding user activity
patterns, analyzing network protocol dynamics, and evalu-
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
S3’10, September 20, 2010, Chicago, Illinois, USA.
Copyright 2010 ACM 978-1-4503-0144-2/10/09 ...$10.00.
ating the performance, reliability, and security of new net-
work designs. We, at Dartmouth College, have monitored
a campus-wide wireless local-area network (WLAN) for al-
most one decade and some of our datasets have been made
public through our CRAWDAD archive [1]. By their nature,
these traces captured from production networks inevitably
contain private or proprietary information about the tar-
get networks and their users. To preserve users’ privacy,
we need to sanitize the network traces before sharing them
with the public. Many sanitization techniques have been
proposed and developed to make the traces resistant against
host or user re-identification attacks [3,4]. These techniques
mainly focus on truncating or randomizing sensitive fields in
the datasets that may be explicitly linked to user identity,
such as IP/MAC addresses, or contain sensitive information
that users may not be willing to share with others, such as
TCP/UDP payloads.
In this work, we demonstrate that a new type of privacy
attack, which we call CRF-based correlation attack, can be
launched to compromise a victim’s mobility privacy from
user association logs. In such a correlation attack, the ad-
versary first downloads a sanitized user association log re-
leased in the past. All users’ MAC addresses in this log are
sanitized and thus unknown to the adversary. Provided that
the adversary observes a sequence of AP association records
of the target victim for a short period of time,1 his goal is
to infer the MAC address from the released dataset that is
associated with the victim. If done correctly, the attacker
obtains broader knowledge of the victim’s mobility history
from the released dataset, which leads to an infringement on
the privacy of the user.
2. WLAN USER ASSOCIATION LOGS
WLAN user association logs record where and when a
user has connected to the network. Each row of the user
association log has four comma-separated fields: the MAC
address of the wireless card, the name of the AP that the
wireless card has connected with, and the start and end
POSIX timestamp. The following is a snippet of the user
association log we extract from the SNMP information:2
1Such knowledge can be obtained either through a trojan
installed on the victim’s machine, or by following the victim
and observing her activities (e.g., when she opens or closes
her laptop lid), or from a separately released non-sanitized
dataset.
2The displayed MAC addresses have been anonymized to
protect user privacy.
001d4f3bc496, 14.5.1, 1251690285, 1251691544
002608e4cdf7, 80.3.2, 1251690458, 1251691544
0021e9082bfd, 142.6.1, 1251689384, 1251691544
Two things are worth noting. First, because the Aruba
Mobility Controller only generates the start timestamp for
each connection and we poll the controller every 5 minutes,
the connection’s end timestamp is only an estimated value,
whose error is therefore bounded by 5 minutes. Second, we
use a hierarchical naming scheme for APs in the dataset.
For an AP named x.y.z, x is its building number, y is its
floor number, and z is its serial number within the floor.
Sanitization. When sanitizing the user association logs,
we use a one-to-one mapping function to rename the MAC
addresses in the original dataset. Hence, the anonymized
MAC addresses in the sanitized dataset do not have any
physical meaning and are thus only symbolic names. By
taking advantage of its hierarchical naming scheme, we trun-
cate an AP’s name according to different sanitization levels.
For example, if we want to only keep building and floor in-
formation, we truncate the AP’s name from x.y.z to x.y.
3. THREAT MODEL
Given the simple sanitization scheme discussed in the pre-
vious section, there is one key question: is it possible to
obtain private information from the user association log if
it is released to the public? To answer this question, we
first define the three assumptions in our threat model, which
presents the capabilities and knowledge required by the at-
tacker to succeed.
Assumption 1: The adversary has access to a sanitized
WLAN user association log Ls, which is shared to the pub-
lic by a trace publisher. There are Ns users in this log. All
users’ real MAC addresses are anonymized in Ls using a one-
to-one one-way mapping function: each real MAC address
has been replaced with a new identifier IDi (1 ≤ i ≤ Ns).
Hence, given an anonymized MAC address IDi, the adver-
sary cannot find the real MAC address that is mapped to
IDi. The AP’s name can be either preserved or truncated.
The rest of the fields, such as the start and end timestamp of
each connection, are preserved during the sanitization pro-
cess.
Assumption 2: The adversary knows a sequence of as-
sociation records about a victim user’s device, denoted by
Q. This sequence of records, Q, need not be collected dur-
ing the same time period as Ls (otherwise the problem will
be trivial). The information provided in Q can be rather
coarse. For example, the adversary may only need to know
which building the victim has visited instead of which exact
AP the victim has associated with.
Assumption 3: The adversary knows that the sanitized
dataset Ls must contain the victim’s AP association records.
In many cases, Ls is published at an organization level (e.g.,
by a university) and thus contains complete AP association
logs of the organization’s wireless users. Hence, if the adver-
sary knows that the victim was a member of the organization
when Ls was collected, it is easy for him to know that Ls
should contain the victim’s AP association records.
Given the three assumptions in the adversarial model, the
(exact) correlation attack problem is then formulated as fol-
lows: given Ls and Q, which anonymized identity IDi (1 ≤
i ≤ Ns) in Ls has also generated Q? In practice, however,
due to incomplete data for training or inference, or some
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Figure 1: Represent an user’s association log using
association activity template
intra- and inter-user association activity variations, finding
an algorithm to solve the exact correlation attack problem
is difficult or even infeasible. In this work, we consider a
relaxed version of this problem. The (relaxed) correlation
attack problem is formulated as follows: given Ls and Q,
which subset of anonymized identities would contain the one
that generated Q with high probability?
4. ALGORITHM DESCRIPTION
The intuition behind the proposed algorithm is that differ-
ent users may have different association behaviors, and the
differences between these behaviors are distinguishable and
can be modeled from the temporal and spatial information
contained in the user association logs. For example, Tom
often stays in the library in the morning for 2 hours and
then goes to the classroom around 3pm in the afternoon,
while Jack spends most of day in the lab and goes back to
his dormitory at late night. We aim to build a model that
not only can characterize such inter-user differences but also
is robust to intra-user variations.
4.1 Data Representation
We propose a new approach that uses association activity
templates to represent user association logs. In this method,
we first split the user’s association log into day-to-day pieces
and then for each day build an individual association activ-
ity template. An association activity template is a collection
of association activity tags and their corresponding associa-
tion activity vectors. As shown in Figure 1, the association
activity tag is the name of the visited AP. Each element
in an association activity vector is called a feature. In the
current implementation, we let an activity vector have six
features: duration, day of week, starting time, previous AP,
next to previous AP, and next AP .
4.2 Algorithm Procedure
We now discuss the steps in launching correlation attacks
against released a dataset Ls using an observed sequence Q.
The procedure is summarized as follows:
Step 1. For each user in Ls, split his/her association log
into day-to-day pieces and represent each day’s log us-
ing an association activity template as described in
Section 4.1.
Step 2. Feed each user’s association activity templates into
a linear-chain CRF [2] to model this user’s association
behavior. As there are Ns users in Ls, we build Ns
CRF models. The input fed to a CRF model is a
sequence of association activity vectors (Figure 1) and
the output is a sequence of association activity tags,
which are actually AP names. Let CRFi(V) denote the
output from the i-th user’s CRF model, where 1 ≤ i ≤
Ns and V denotes the sequence of association activity
vectors fed to the CRF model.
Step 3. For the observed AP association sequence Q, we
preprocess it as described in Section 4.1 to obtain an
association activity template T . Let VT and GT denote
the sequence of association activity vectors and the
sequence of association activity tags in template T ,
respectively.
Step 4. We feed VT to all CRF models trained in Step 2
and count the number of tags that overlap between
GT and CRFi(VT ) (1 ≤ i ≤ Ns), a score we denote
wi. The intuition applied here is that the victim’s
CRF model is more likely to produce correct activity
association tags from her observed activity association
vectors in Q, and therefore score wi is higher than the
others if IDi is the victim’s identifier in the released
AP association dataset.
Step 5. We sort all the users based on score wi in non-
increasing order and the algorithm outputs this sorted
list.
Ideally, the top identifier on the sorted list should be
treated as the sole candidate that generated the observed
AP association sequence Q. As mentioned in Section 3, due
to various limitations in practice, the top identifier may not
correspond to the victim who produced Q. Thus, we tackle
the relaxed correlation attack problem instead and consider
a small number of top identifiers on the sorted list as possi-
ble candidates. Clearly, from the attacker’s perspective, the
smaller the number of top identifiers needed to include the
victim’s, the more successful his attack is.
5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We used a 62-day user association log collected between
January 4, 2010 and March 6, 2010, corresponding to one
academic term, in this evaluation. Because Dartmouth’s
wireless network is open to anyone, we eliminated those
transient users who were active fewer than 50 days or who
connected with fewer than 10 unique APs, and the result-
ing dataset contained 2,179,671 association records, 3,313
distinct users, and 1,364 distinct APs. We partition this
into 10 bins of approximately the same length for each user.
We perform 10 rounds of experiments. In the j-th round
(1 ≤ j ≤ 10), we use the j-th bin of each user’s AP associ-
ation records as the testing dataset (Lu) and the remaining
nine as the training dataset (Ls) to build the CRF models.
The results shown here are the 10-round averages. Under
this configuration, the length of a victim’s AP association
sequence observed by the adversary, Q (Q ∈ Lu), is 5-6
days. This short trace is all the knowledge needed by the
adversary about the victim. We use the minimum size of
candidate identifier set (MSCIS) as the metric to measure
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Figure 2: Evaluation of the CRF-based method
the attack efficiency. Consider the relaxed correlation at-
tack problem with a sanitized user association dataset Ls
and an observed sequence of AP association records Q. For
each IDi where 1 ≤ i ≤ Ns in Ls, we compute score wi
according to Step 4 in the CRF-based method. Suppose
that IDj is the user ID of the victim who generated Q. The
MSCIS is defined as the number of user IDs whose scores are
no smaller than wj . MSCIS establishes an upper bound on
how many candidate user IDs need be considered in order
to contain the victim’s user ID in the sanitized dataset.
We apply the proposed method to three datasets with dif-
ferent sanitization strengths. Figure 2 shows that when AP’s
building, floor and serial information are preserved, 70.28%
of 3,313 users could be pinpointed exactly from Ls (MSCIS
= 1). In the worst case that only the building information
is preserved, 56.25% users are still pinpoint-able.
Due to lack of space here, further details about the pro-
posed approach and more comprehensive evaluation results
will be presented in a subsequent paper.
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